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Two stumbling blocks to a general account 
of selection: Replication and information
William M. Baum
Department of Psychology, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NC
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Abstract: When one takes the evolution of operant behavior as prototype,
one sees that the term replication is too tied to the peculiarities of genetic
evolution. A more general term is recurrence. The important problem
raised by recurrence is not “information” but relationship: deciding when
two occurrences belong to the same lineage. That is solved by looking at
common environmental effects.
The authors have made some good progress toward abstracting
the concept of General Evolutionary Process. Particularly con-
structive are their emphasis on the iterative nature of the process
of selection and their separation of interaction from replication.
They are right also in their implication that part of the importance
of this project lies in clarifying selection as a type of causality and
as a valid basis for explanation (Baum & Heath 1992). The notion
of operant behavior has been resisted by laypeople and scientists
alike for the same reasons that evolutionary theory has been re-
sisted: (1) an enormous preference for immediate (“push”) causes,
even if they have to be imagined, and (2) the implied rejection of
cherished imaginary immediate causes such as agency, will, pur-
pose, and intelligence. I suggest, however, that the authors might
have made more progress had they considered operant evolution
(i.e., shaping) as a prototype, instead of genetic evolution.
In attempting to abstract the General Evolutionary Process, no
necessity requires that genetic evolution be taken as the proto-
type. It has the advantages that it is widely accepted among the
scientific community and that its mechanisms are partially under-
stood, but it has the disadvantage that its peculiarities are easily
taken for necessary attributes. If instead one takes operant evolu-
tion as prototype, at least two issues are clarified: the term repli-
cation and the concept of information.
Replication. Even if it is true that DNA is in a sense “copied”
(and the facts of recombination make this doubtful), in no useful
sense are repeated occurrences of a behavioral pattern copies. If
I brush my teeth every night before I go to bed, in no sense is my
brushing one night a replica of my brushing the night before. Even
though we are ignorant of the way the workings of the brain affect
behavior, nothing we know suggests there might be a replica or
representation of tooth-brushing somewhere in the brain either.
Rather, as with other natural events, such as sunrise, hurricanes,
birth, and death, the event occurs when the conditions are right
(bedtime, bathroom, toothbrush, toothpaste, and so on). (The his-
torical origins of tooth-brushing in a history of reinforcement and
punishment – that is, by iterative selection – are another matter,
of course.)
A more neutral term would be recurrence, meaning just “oc-
curring again” or “turning up repeatedly.” Replication would be
just one type of recurrence – recurrence by copying. Other mech-
anisms of recurrence may be imagined; for operant behavior, we
have the effects of context and cues known as stimulus control.
Thus, one need not search for some sort of copying when talking
about the recurrence of behavior. In particular, one need not talk
nonsensically about things like “memes” “jumping from brain to
brain” when talking about the spread of a behavioral pattern within
a cultural group (Baum 2000; Dawkins 1989a).
Information. The authors assert, “the notion of ‘information’ is
fundamental to any account of replication” and “In replication the
relevant information incorporated into the structure of replicators
is ‘passed on’ to successive generations of replicators.” Even if
these statements were true of replication, they are irrelevant to the
more general idea of recurrence. The authors’ reliance on the no-
tion of replication leads them to misstate the important issue in-
volved, which is about relationship. Even if the structure of repli-
cators is passed on, for purposes of evolutionary theory, the
problem is not pondering the “information incorporated”; the
problem is deciding when two sequential occurrences belong to
the same lineage.
The short answer would be that two occurrences belong to the
same lineage if they share common ancestry (Ghiselin 1997). This,
however, raises the question of defining “ancestry” in general
terms. Here again, the example of operant evolution sheds light,
because it leads us to see that “common ancestry” means common
history of selection. My tooth-brushings Monday night and Tues-
day night belong to the same lineage, not because of any “infor-
mation incorporated,” but because they may be attributed to a
common origin – say, childhood training (i.e., exhortations from
my parents and dentist, approval and disapproval, cavities or the
lack of them, and so on; Baum 2000). The common origin and
common history of selection, however, depend on common envi-
ronmental effects. Both the origin of my tooth-brushing (exhorta-
tions, etc.) and the selection of my tooth-brushing depended on
past effects of contributing to dental hygiene. Thus, common “an-
cestry” for behavior comes down to a common basis for selection
or common history of environmental effects. In more abstract
terms, two occurrences belong to the same lineage if they are at-
tributed to the same history of interaction with the environment.
Dawkins (1989b) makes a parallel point for genetic evolution
when he explains that the genes that promote dam-construction
in beavers were selected by their effects on the beavers’ environ-
ment. Indeed the genes “for” dam-construction are defined by
those effects, for they are nowhere apparent in the structure of the
beavers’ DNA. Although the idea that genes influence behavior is
widely accepted, the content of this idea differs little from the
wide acceptance that the brain influences behavior. Almost noth-
ing is known of how this occurs. If we had to rely on examination
of structures in DNA or the brain to define the units of recur-
rence, we would be in deep trouble. But defining the recurring
units in terms of their common environmental effects solves this
otherwise intractable problem. Instead of “information,” environ-
mental effects turn out to be the key to defining lineages. I doubt
one would recognize this without considering the evolution of be-
havior, whether across generations or within a lifetime.
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Abstract: The selectionist account of behavior is actually a focused dis-
cussion of operant selection. To this end, the authors essentially exclude
stimuli from their analysis. This exclusion is inconsistent with the impor-
tance placed on environmental interaction in their general account. Fur-
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ther, this exclusion limits the generality of their account by missing im-
portant sources of stimulus-elicited behavior (e.g., classical conditioning).
In the target article, Hull et al. clearly accomplish one of their
goals. That is, they successfully describe individual, immune, and
operant selection by repetition of three processes: variation, repli-
cation, and environmental interaction. Further, they provide the
reader with much to think about. What is variation within each 
selection system? How does the repetition of the processes gen-
erate the variation and why is the variation differentially con-
strained? What retention mechanisms are required to retain past
selected information for future selection? How can environmen-
tal interaction affect this retention?
Although I found the target article thought provoking, I was dis-
appointed in the false advertisement of the title. I was expecting
a “general account of selection” for behavior. However, they only
provide a selection account of a narrowly defined sub-set of be-
havior. That is, the authors chose to emphasize “operant learning.”
I appreciate this choice given the daunting goal they set for them-
selves. Also, operant conditioning is a natural choice given that a
selectionist framework has been more readily applied to research
in that area. Perhaps my disappointment was greatest by their
choice to seemingly ignore the role of stimuli in the generation of
what the authors term “responses” or “interactors.” This choice is
made explicit when the authors state “In operant theory, activity
designated as a ‘response’ does not require a stimulus.” In the fol-
lowing paragraphs, I would like to note why I believe a general se-
lectionist model of behavior (versus “operant theory”) should take
into consideration stimuli.
I will use the bar-press example employed by the authors as a
starting point for discussing the importance of stimuli in a good
selectionist model of behavior. The bar-press response would not
be possible without the presence of the metal lever (bar) that ex-
tends into the experimental apparatus. This bar is a complex
multi-modal stimulus likely including visual, olfactory, spatial, and
tactile elements. One would be hard pressed to argue that the
stimulus elements associated with the bar do not set the occasion,
in part, for the response of depressing the lever. Other stimuli that
will contribute to the pattern of responding include passage of
time and environment (context).
Examination of response records of a well-trained animal on a
schedule of reinforcement (e.g., FR) will reveal surprising vari-
ability in response generation. Such measures as initial response
latency, inter-response time, and time to termination response will
vary within a range (see Fig. 1 of target article). What are the
sources of this variability? One answer to this question is that dif-
ferent inter-response times, and so on, were reinforced (i.e., se-
lected by the consequence). Albeit likely, this answer is only par-
tially satisfying. Direct observation of a rat receiving food
reinforcement will reveal the development of interesting behav-
iors that compete with the bar-press response. These competing
behaviors likely contribute to the variability. For instance, even
though food has not been delivered, the rat will frequently move
away from the bar and toward the food delivery area often sniff-
ing, licking, and chewing the food cup or dipper entry. Clearly, this
pattern of behaviors has been reinforced. However, why does this
behavior occur in the food area and the not in the rear left corner
of the apparatus? Those stimuli in the food delivery area are
closely associated (temporally and spatially) with food.
Similarly, later in operant training sniffing, licking, and chewing
type behaviors are also directed toward the bar. Students of oper-
ant conditioning will recognize this phenomenon as similar to that
observed by Breland and Breland (1961). That is, stimuli closely
associated with food (the metal bar in this example) will come to
control food-related behaviors. These behaviors are conceptual-
ized as evolutionarily selected response-tendencies to stimuli that
have acquired motivational (appetitive in this example) value (e.g.,
Bolles 1975). To me, the present observations indicate that stim-
ulus – outcome selection (Pavlovian/classical conditioning) likely
occurs along with operant selection – regardless of the experi-
menter’s intention. What sparse systematic research exists tends
to support this notion. For example, Shapiro (1960) trained dogs
to bar-press on a FI 2-min schedule of food reinforcement. In ad-
dition to measuring bar-pressing, the dogs were surgically pre-
pared so that salivation could be monitored. As expected, bar-
pressing was infrequent early in the interval and then increased as
time to feed approached. Of interest to the present discussion was
that salivation showed a similar pattern. This result has been taken
to indicate that the cues associated with bar-pressing and passage
of time acquire to ability to elicit salivation via stimulus-outcome
selection (Donahoe & Palmer 1994; Kintsch & Witte 1962).
Hull et al. note the necessity of variability in a general selection
account. I fully agree with this conclusion. One main point of the
above discussion is to emphasize the importance of stimuli in the
generation of variability. Responses do not occur in the absence of
stimuli. Some of this stimulus-elicited variability is the result of
“gene-based” selection; other variability is acquired during be-
havioral selection in the broad sense of the term. Along similar
lines, the authors of the target article emphasize the importance
of “environmental interaction” in a general account of selection.
The very nature of the concept requires the object of selection
(“responses” or “interactors” in the case of operant selection) to
be affected by the stimulus conditions that define the environ-
ment. Indeed, in section 5.3, the authors briefly mention this fact
by noting that “events” can have “discriminative, conditional, or
motivating functions.”
To close this commentary I would like to applaud the authors’
emphasis on the importance of elucidating the physiological mech-
anism responsible for retention processes. This discussion would
be further enriched by including stimuli into a selection account
of behavior. This is especially true for stimulus-outcome selec-
tion (Pavlovian/classical conditioning). There are numerous well-
studied in vivo and in vitro models of neural plasticity for classical
conditioning (e.g., Boa et al. 1998; LeDoux 2000; Steinmetz
2000).
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Abstract: Many analogies exist between the process of evolution by nat-
ural selection and of learning by reinforcement and punishment. A full ex-
tension of the evolutionary analogy to learning to include analogues of the
fitness, genotype, development, environmental influences, and phenotype
concepts makes possible a single theory of the learning process able to en-
compass all of the elementary procedures known to yield learning.
The article by Hull et al. on the roles of variation, replication, and
environmental interaction in selection processes hopefully will
stand as a beacon in a long but only sporadically-connected line of
works on the similarity between evolution by natural selection and
certain physiological processes. The response to an article on
learning and the evolutionary analogy I once wrote from my PhD.
dissertation (Blute 1977, see http://cogprints.soton.ac.uk/) was ei-
ther incomprehension or a rejection of all general learning theory
including the utility of the analogy. Today, however, more psy-
chologists understand evolutionary theory and they understand
that something which evolves and is inherited necessarily also de-
velops and functions physiologically.
Some elementary analogies between learning and evolution are
obvious to those acquainted with both theories. Both are based on
populational thinking. Reinforcement and punishment play the
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